**Науки о земле. Текст 1.**

**Introduction to politics of climate change:**

**discourses of policy and practice**

**in developing countries**

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The past 20 years have witnessed a momentous

surge in interest in the idea of climate change.

Much of this growth is due to the field of

climate science, which has produced compelling

evidence to show that human actions are significantly

changing the composition of the atmosphere, which is

altering the functioning of the climate system (IPCC

2007). It is also attributable to the tens of thousands of

organisations, networks, companies, consultants and

advocates concerned with a host of climate changerelated

response issues, ranging from energy and

infrastructure, to risk management and reduction, to

community-based adaptation that have been spawned

as a result. Many of these actors are supported

by major financial investments. For example, in

March 2010 the UK Department for International

Development (DFID) announced that it would be

investing £50 million in a new programme, the

Climate and Development Knowledge Network

(CDKN), to ‘help developing countries navigate the

challenges of climate change’. This trend is set to

continue with tens of billions of dollars of climate

finance pledged by the international community over

the next 10 years (COP 2009). In this way, climate

change has become ‘one of *the* defining contemporary

international development issues’ (Tanner and

Allouche 2011, 1).

 Studies of contemporary climate change from

greenhouse gas emissions and land use changes

originated in the natural sciences-based literature and

the science-based institutions of the United Nations,

particularly the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC). This purely physical framing of the

climate change issue adopted by the IPCC has

dominated policymaking since the mid 1980s (Hulme

2007) and associated concepts – most notably

‘mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’ – have quickly garnered

legitimacy in international debates (McNamara and

Gibson 2009). However, in recent years, mounting

efforts by the international policy community to link

climate change interventions to human development

goals that reduce poverty and promote equity

have been challenged on the grounds that they

systematically underplay critical cultural, socioeconomic,

historic and political dimensions of human

societies (Gaillard 2010; Mercer 2010; Marino and

Ribot 2012; Farbotko and Lazrus 2011).

**Науки о земле. Текст 2.**

In the field of environment and development, a

concern with how people imagine human–climate

interactions and therefore begin to build images or

narratives about particular groups of people,

geographical places or periods of time is not new

(cf. Furedi 2007; Endfield and Nash 2002). Some

scholars view these types of cultural conception as

hegemonic, in the sense that they dominate thinking

and structure institutional arrangements. For example,

Bankoff (2001, 19), examining the historical roots of

the ‘hazard’ discursive framework, argues that

‘tropicality, development and vulnerability form part

of one and the same essentialising and generalising

cultural discourse that denigrates large regions of the

world as disease-ridden, poverty-stricken and disasterprone’,

thus justifying Western intervention. Other

scholars, however, see a greater plurality of images

and narratives in which discourses can become

powerful, but never completely hegemonic (Hilhorst

2001). This approach, for example, is used by

McNamara and Gibson (2009) who show how the

dominant representation of people living in the Pacific

as ‘climate refugees’ by the international climate

change community has been resisted by the islanders

themselves, many of whom do not accord with the

action of ‘fleeing’ as part of their vision for the future.

The papers presented in this Themed Section reflect

both the hegemonic and more pluralistic positions

outlined above. The articles are mostly case study

based and focus on sub-Saharan Africa and Small

Island Developing States (SIDS), which are considered

to be among the most vulnerable regions to climate

change in the world (Christensen *et al*. 2007). The

articles are organised around three interlinked

themes. The first theme concerns the *processes* of

rapid technicalisation and professionalisation of the

climate change ‘industry’. According to Escobar,

development has ‘fostered a way of conceiving of

social life as a technical problem, as a matter for

rational decision and management to be entrusted to

the group of people – the development professionals –

whose specialised knowledge allegedly qualifies them

for that task’ (Escobar 1997, 91). The effect of these

processes is that the terms of the international

development debate are substantially narrowed as the

‘intellectual distance between donor and recipient is

maintained’, and potentially critical discourses are

co-opted (Kothari 2005, 428).

**Науки о земле. Текст 3.**

These concerns are taken up in this issue by Sasser

(2013) who shows how one particular managerial

‘solution’ to the climate change problem that focuses

on demographics and population control has had the

effect of ‘narrowing understandings of sexual and

reproductive health and rights (SRHR) issues for

women through the technicalisation of [their] rights’.

Weisser *et al*. (2013), also in this issue, further

develop this theme by demonstrating how ‘expertdefined’,

‘mechanistic’ understandings of climate

change adaptation operating in international policy

circles are interpreted and implemented by multiple

actors operating at national and sub-national levels.

Moreover, these technicalisation processes are not

necessarily neutral but tend to tip the terms of the

climate change debate towards compatibility with

the dominant ideology of our time, neoliberalism,

and the associated emphasis on trade liberalisation,

marketisation, deregulisation and volunteerism

(Humphreys 2009). There is now a growing literature

which demonstrates the increasing neoliberalisation

of climate change policy and practice (e.g. see

Lohmann 2011; Featherstone 2013; Felli 2013). In

this Themed Section, Arnall (2013) reflects these

concerns by showing how government- and NGOled

efforts to ‘build resilience’ to climate change in

the context of central Mozambique readily fit into the

county’s dominant neoliberal development agenda.

The second theme deals with the ideological

*effects* of the climate change industry, which is

‘depoliticisation’. This term is most associated with

Ferguson (1994, xv) who likened development in

Lesotho to an ‘anti-politics machine’, ‘depoliticising

everything that it touches’, by depriving the subjects

of anti-poverty interventions of their history and

politics. More recently, efforts by donors to

incorporate new approaches and techniques that

attempt to reverse the top-down hegemony of

development agencies, such as participation, have

similarly come under attack (cf. Cooke and Kothari

2001; Hickey and Mohan 2005). This is evident from

the large body of case studies showing how ‘one-sizefits-

all development recipes’ that focus on concepts

that everyone can ostensibly agree on, such as

‘empowerment’, deflect attention away from the

political reforms needed for structural change

(Cornwall and Brock 2005; Botchway 2001).

**Науки о земле. Текст 4.**

Recently, Felli and Castro (2012) have argued that the

high-profile Foresight Report on Migration and

Global Environmental Change (Foresight: Migration

and Global Environmental Change 2011) has shifted

analytical attention away from the socioeconomic

and political context to refocus it onto the

individual’s qualities and his or her ‘capacity to

adapt’. Similarly, this Themed Section argues that a

focus on climate change by researchers, policymakers

and practitioners can deflect attention away from

underlying political conditions of vulnerability and

exploitation towards the nature of the physical hazard

itself, be it drought, flood or some other environmental

perturbation. Kelman (2013), for example,

argues in this issue that, in the context of SIDS, the

fundamental challenge that islanders face is not so

much the hazard of climate per se, but the reason

why SIDS peoples often do not have the resources or

options to resolve climate change and other

development challenges themselves, on their own

terms.

The third theme concerns the institutional *effects* of

an insufficiently socialised idea of climate change,

which is the maintenance of existing relations of

power or their reconfiguration in favour of the already

powerful. Climate change mitigation and adaptation

are complex, contested concepts that have spawned

a wide range of policies and interventions across

the developing world, ranging from infrastructure

development, to agricultural extension, to

resettlement of populations considered to be at risk of

climate-related hazards (Kelman 2010). The flexibility

of the mitigation and adaptation paradigms might be

considered by some as a sign of the concepts’

strengths. However, as pointed out by Hulme (2007),

such properties also endow them with a near ‘infinite

plasticity . . . a malleable envoy enlisted in support of

too many rulers’ (pp. 9–10). In this issue, Arnall (2013)

and Kothari (2013) demonstrate how these processes

have come to pass in the cases of Mozambique and

the Maldives respectively. The authors show how

climate change is being used in their respective

countries to validate the re-emergence of past

unpopular social policies, some of which might

actually exacerbate vulnerability. The focus in both

instances is on involuntary resettlement, an

intervention that has received growing interest from

the international policy community either as a

potential climate change adaptation measure or as

exemplifying a failure to adapt to climate change

(Bogardi and Warner 2008; Warner 2011).

**Науки о земле. Текст 5.**

**The wave of the future? Youth advocacy at the**

**nexus of population and climate change**

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In recent years, young activists under 25 have increasingly advocated slowing global population

growth through family planning as a climate change strategy. While this approach is developed and

disseminated by population and development NGOs, young advocates transform the debate by

asserting their role as activist leaders on issues of climate change, population, and women’s

empowerment. This article explores the logics and discursive strategies employed by a group of

transnational youth during a workshop at the sixth annual Climate Change Conference of Youth

(COY) as well as training workshops in the USA. It tracks the practices through which young climate

change activists engage demographic-climate studies and broader development discourses as a

basis for advocacy to influence international population and family planning policies. I argue that

development paradigms, activist discourse, and new demographic-climate studies represent both an

expansion of the range of issues considered under the climate change umbrella, and simultaneously

a narrowing of understandings of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) issues for

women through the technicalisation of women’s rights.

KEY WORDS: youth activism, climate, NGOs, population, gender

**Introduction**

At the 2010 Cancun meetings of the International

Climate Change Conference of Youth,

or COY61, one workshop in particular stood

apart from others on the agenda. Entitled ‘Youth

support sexual and reproductive health and rights

(SRHR) for a just and sustainable world’, the event

promised to equip young activists with advocacy

solutions for both climate change and global population

growth through an emphasis on family

planning, SRHR, and women’s empowerment2.

Workshop organisers emphasised youth leadership,

arguing that young people occupy a particularly

important position in turning the tide on both global

population growth and climate change. A policy

document supporting the workshop reinforced this

point, proclaiming that ‘meeting the SRHR needs of

young people around the world can help stabilise

population and contribute to comprehensive strategies

to reduce CO2 emission’. Drawing on a study

published earlier that year, authors of the document

underscored the importance of family planning as a

climate strategy: ‘by meeting the demand for voluntary

family planning, global emissions will be

reduced by between 8 and 15 percent’3.

While the SRHR focus set it apart from other COY6

activities, the workshop took place within a broader

discourse, situating climate change in the contexts of

population, family planning and women’s reproductive

health. The new millennium witnessed a dramatic

increase in newspaper articles, media reports and scientific

studies linking women’s fertility, family planning

and global population growth to climate change

and other environmental issues. According to one

survey, newspapers, magazine articles and blog posts

citing the terms ‘population growth’ and ‘environment’

or ‘climate change’ increased fourfold in the

3-year period from 2005 to 2008 (Verilli and Piscitelli

2008). Population growth, it seems, is ‘back’ on the

public environmental agenda.

**Науки о земле. Текст 6.**

These arguments echo, albeit in revised form, the

long-familiar neo-Malthusian narratives that have

served as a justification for population control efforts

in earlier decades. While Malthus argued in the late

eighteenth century that human population growth

outpaced the earth’s ability to sustain life through

food provisioning, neo-Malthusians in the twentieth

century broadened and expanded these arguments,

blaming population growth for everything from soil

erosion to deforestation, food insecurity and climate

change. At the heart of Malthusianism is the assumption

of a universal human whose resource consumption

behaviour is everywhere equivalent – thus

equally comparable across space and time, and

subject to universal claims about the environmental

benefits of population reductions.

In the mid to late twentieth century, neo-Malthusian

calls among American foreign policy experts for

global population control influenced coercive foreign

policies, from the withholding of food aid to hungry

populations, to incentivised or even forced sterilisations

of women and men in several global South

countries (Connelly 2008; Ross 1998; Hartmann

1995). Neo-Malthusian demographic goals also

played a key role in the development and expansion

of international family planning as a core component

of US foreign policy (Halfon 2007; Connelly 2008);

however, this approach has since fallen out of favour,

due in large part to women’s transnational activism.

Shifts in the 1990s changed the paradigm of international

population and development policies and

program interventions, replacing demographically

driven population control with an emphasis on the

sexual and reproductive health needs of the individual

woman (McIntosh and Finkle 1995). Comprehensive

sexual and reproductive health education, voluntary

access to a range of contraceptive methods, and an

emphasis on women’s and girls’ education are now

central components of international population and

family planning interventions (Mazur 2010; United

Nations 1995).

At the same time, suggesting that the pace of

climate change can be slowed through providing universal

access to contraceptives relies on a reductive

logic in which women’s fertility – not the conditions

of capitalist production and consumption – is the

fundamental driver of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions4.

While the approach is familiar, in the case of

climate change, the stakes are more dramatic.